The Philippines and the United States carried out their 7th joint maritime sail on Wednesday, 04 June 2025, in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea), with the announcement released on Thursday, 05 June 2025 (Reuters, 2025). This development places the Philippines at a volatile crossroads as maritime disputes with China escalate. The recent drills — the seventh such exercise in 2025 — highlight Manila’s deepening alignment with Washington amid Beijing’s growing assertiveness (Reuters, 2025). These operations go beyond naval maneuvers; they signal a broader geopolitical recalibration, reflecting Manila’s determination to defend its sovereignty while heightening reliance on foreign partners. The intensifying standoff raises pressing questions about the Philippines’ foreign policy trajectory, its economic resilience, and the prospects for peace across the Indo-Pacific.

China’s Response: Warnings and Pushback
Beijing has consistently criticized the Philippines’ security engagements with the United States, framing them as provocations that undermine regional stability. China’s foreign ministry argues that such drills “militarize the South China Sea” and threaten its sovereignty (Reuters, 2025). These warnings are not mere rhetoric — they are part of Beijing’s broader strategy to delegitimize Philippine actions by portraying Manila as a pawn of U.S. foreign policy. In this narrative, China positions itself as the aggrieved power, attempting to sway both regional neighbors and the international community toward its side.
Philippine Policy Choices: Between Sovereignty and Dependence
For Manila, the balancing act between sovereignty and dependence is fraught with contradictions. On one hand, joint drills with the United States bolster the Philippines’ deterrence capability and reinforce commitments under the Mutual Defense Treaty. On the other, overreliance on Washington risks trapping the Philippines in a great-power rivalry that could limit its diplomatic flexibility. This tension reflects the broader challenge of small and middle powers caught between competing giants: how to safeguard national security while preserving strategic autonomy.
Implications for National Stability
National stability is increasingly vulnerable to the fallout of strained ties with China. As one of the Philippines’ largest trading partners, China exerts significant economic leverage. Heightened tensions threaten trade, investments, and the livelihoods of Filipino fisherfolk whose access to traditional fishing grounds remains obstructed by Chinese maritime presence. Domestically, foreign policy choices are judged not only for their strategic logic but also for their tangible impact on ordinary Filipinos. The government must manage the dual task of defending sovereignty and protecting economic resilience.

ASEAN Centrality in the South China Sea Dispute
Amid these tensions, ASEAN centrality is often invoked as a stabilizing framework. At its core, ASEAN centrality refers to the association’s role as the principal platform for managing disputes, fostering cooperation, and engaging external powers in Southeast Asia (China MFA, 2024). President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has repeatedly emphasized ASEAN’s central role, urging member-states to resist unilateral assertiveness and to pursue a rules-based maritime order (Villanueva, 2023; Geducos, 2024).
Yet ASEAN’s unity has proven fragile. Scholars argue that the South China Sea dispute has exposed deep divisions within ASEAN, with some states prioritizing economic ties with Beijing over collective security (Paijuntuek & Pairoh, 2023; Luc, 2020). Efforts to negotiate a binding Code of Conduct with China have dragged on for years, reflecting consensus paralysis and divergent national interests (East Asia Forum, 2025). This inability to act decisively risks eroding ASEAN’s credibility and undermining its claim to centrality in the Indo-Pacific security architecture (Philstar.com, 2024).
For the Philippines, ASEAN centrality offers legitimacy and collective weight when confronting Chinese assertiveness. However, it also limits Manila’s options, as consensus-driven diplomacy can be slow and often results in watered-down responses. Philippine leaders’ frustration with ASEAN’s “soft” approach highlights the risk that the bloc could be sidelined by both China’s unilateralism and the strategic designs of external powers (Teodoro Jr., 2024; SCMP, 2024). Unless ASEAN reforms its decision-making processes and strengthens mechanisms for collective security, its centrality may remain more rhetorical than real.
Regional Security and the Indo-Pacific Order
The Philippines’ choices reverberate beyond its borders. U.S.-Philippine cooperation fits neatly into Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which seeks to counterbalance China’s growing influence. Yet this alignment risks polarizing ASEAN and transforming the South China Sea into a theater of great-power competition. If ASEAN centrality falters, regional order will increasingly be shaped by external powers, undermining Southeast Asia’s ability to chart its own course.

Recommendations: Building Balance and Resilience
To navigate these challenges, the Philippines should consider the following:
- Balance Deterrence with Diplomacy. Manila must sustain joint defense activities with the U.S. for deterrence while simultaneously re-engaging Beijing through dialogue mechanisms to reduce miscalculation.
- Leverage ASEAN Centrality More Effectively. Instead of bypassing ASEAN, the Philippines should work with like-minded ASEAN members to push for a stronger, more binding Code of Conduct and explore reforms that allow flexible coalitions within ASEAN when consensus stalls.
- Diversify Economic Partnerships. Reducing reliance on China for trade and investment by strengthening ties with Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN neighbors can buffer the Philippines against economic coercion.
- Invest in Maritime Self-Reliance. Building a credible coast guard and maritime domain awareness system will allow the Philippines to assert sovereignty without always depending on external powers.
- Promote Regional Dialogue on Collective Security. The Philippines should advocate for a broader Indo-Pacific framework that emphasizes inclusive security rather than military blocs, ensuring ASEAN’s role is preserved and enhanced.
Navigating Between Conflict and Peace
The unfolding dynamics among the Philippines, China, the United States, and ASEAN reflect more than a territorial dispute — they represent a struggle for legitimacy and influence in Asia’s emerging order. China’s hostile responses, Manila’s reliance on Washington, and ASEAN’s fragile centrality all point to a precarious path ahead. The challenge for the Philippines is to assert sovereignty without succumbing to dependency, and to pursue deterrence while sustaining diplomacy. Regional stability will depend on whether ASEAN can strengthen its central role and whether smaller states can resist being consumed by the ambitions of greater powers.
References
China. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2024, May 31). Position paper of the People’s Republic of China on supporting ASEAN centrality in the evolving regional architecture. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn
East Asia Forum. (2025, August 19). ASEAN’s centrality depends on a shift to collective security. https://www.eastasiaforum.org
Geducos, A. (2024, May 13). Marcos affirms ASEAN centrality in resolving South China Sea tensions. Manila Bulletin. https://mb.com.ph
Luc, T. (2020). ASEAN centrality and the major powers: South China Sea case study (Doctoral thesis, University of New South Wales). UNSW Library.
Paijuntuek, T., & Pairoh, N. (2023). The impact of South China Sea dispute on ASEAN centrality. Journal of Politics and Governance, 13(3), 161-183.
Philstar.com. (2024, July 15). Why ASEAN stays silent on South China Sea ruling 8 years on. The Philippine Star.https://www.philstar.com
Reuters. (2025, June 5). Philippines, US hold joint maritime drills for seventh time. Reuters.https://www.reuters.com/world/china/philippines-us-hold-joint-maritime-drills-seventh-time-2025-06-05
SCMP. (2024, May 10). Marcos slams “soft” ASEAN response to Chinese aggression. South China Morning Post.https://www.scmp.com
Teodoro Jr., J. (2024, June 2). Philippine frustration with ASEAN’s indecision. Rappler. https://www.rappler.com
Villanueva, R. (2023, November 16). Marcos calls for ASEAN centrality in South China Sea resolution. Inquirer.net.https://www.inquirer.net











